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Kovaci: Democracy in Albania

II. Introduction
After World War II, Albania retreated into a dictatorship based on Marxism-Leninism
that ruled through persecutions and silencing opposition, thus severely limiting civil society. In
1990, the authoritarian communist regime in Albania fell as Albania began transitioning into a
democracy during what Samuel Huntington called the “third wave” of democratic transitions.1
Since its isolation and autarky, Albania has improved relations with its neighboring countries,
joined NATO, and signed the Stabilization and Association Pact with the European Union in an
effort to rejoin the international community as a democracy. However, despite improvements in
democratic governance, Albania faces a rough transition to democracy due to a lack of
democratic political culture. In the 2010 Democracy Index of 165 countries, Albania ranked 84th
with a score of 5.86 out of 10. With the exceptions of Russia and Bosnia, Albania is the only
Eastern European country categorized as a hybrid regime instead of a flawed democracy, thus
ranking below its neighbors.2 Furthermore, while Albania has re-entered the arena of
international relations, its citizens have yet to strongly exhibit values of global citizenship that
are necessary for taking action in issues of global importance today. Albanian democracy faces
low levels of civic engagement, as well as low levels of rule of law due to corruption and weak
capacity of state institutions.3
Civil society in Albania has risen to meet the challenges of the emerging democracy in a
new global context with an emerging international framework of values. After 1990 civil society
organizations (CSO) first formed, focusing on issues of human rights, humanitarian aid, and
good governance. But the effects and remnants of the communist past in Albanian society and
politics impede its work in democratization and citizens’ engagement with global issues. While it
has had some successes, Albanian civil society post-1990 has been mostly ineffective in helping
Albania to democratize because its internal structure and external environment is influenced by
the Communist legacy.

III. Theory and Literature Review
Democracy, Civil Society, and Trust
A democracy is a form of government where the governed rule directly or through
elected representatives. Theorists like Locke and Rousseau base the emergence of democracy on
the “Social Contract;” a group of people come together to form a government by consenting to
its rule and to each individual’s responsibility in said government.4 5 Rule of law in a state and in
global governance is defined by states’, institutions’, and citizens’ open and fair adherence to

1

Theodore Kaltsounis, The Democratization of Albania: Democracy from within (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010) 148, accessed December 2, 2013.
http://fairfield.eblib.com.libdb.fairfield.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=652710.
2
Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010, accessed December 7,
2013, http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf.
3
David L. Phillips, "Albania," American Foreign Policy Interests 27.4 (2005): 309-330, accessed October
20, 2013, Doi: 10.1080/10803920500235137, EBSCOhost (18605996).
4
John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government (New York: Prometheus Books, 1986). 54 - 55.
5
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in Rousseau’s Political
Writings edited by Alan Ritters and Julia Conaway Bondanella (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 3436.
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justice, with accountability according to set standards and laws.6 A democracy has checks and
balances in which different government branches exercise oversight of one another and prevent
abuse. Checks, pluralism of interests, and political actors characterize a free democracy. In a
democracy, citizens have civil liberties and rights that are immune to government intrusion.
One theory about how democratization can come about is the political approach. This
states that democracy can be achieved if actors like political parties, politicians, and local or
international civil society organizations press for democratization. The premise of civil society
leading to democratization follows this approach.7
The engagement of citizens is essential to a democracy and to global citizenship because
democracy and international governance require the input of the governed in decision-making.
Jean Louis Cohen says, “Civil society as the sources of influence and control of representative
political institutions is the heart of a liberal democracy.”8 Citizens act collectively to positively
influence their local or international community through civic engagement.9 Citizens’ actions
and the associations that they form, independently of government, constitute the civil society of a
country. Out of the experience of individuals, government, and civil society, there develops a
certain political culture, a system of “values and beliefs about government.” 10
The idea of civil society has become an indispensable feature of Western democratic
identity.11 Major thinkers contributing to the modern idea of civil society are Alexis de
Tocqueville, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Robert Putnam.
Tocqueville admired civil society in the United States as the vast volunteer associations that dealt
with civil and political life.12 13 Some sources limit the definition of civil society to formal
institutions like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs).
This paper uses a broader definition of civil society, encompassing all collective actions by
citizens in the public sphere with the aim of improving their national and international
community; religion, culture, activism, literature, academia, and art are all part of civil society.
Mainstream theorists from Tocqueville to Putnam believe that civil society fosters trust,
which builds peaceful and stable relations necessary for cooperation in a democracy with global
humanitarian values. Hardin defines trust as a person’s belief that others will not harm him on
purpose, and that people may act in the interest of others.14 Voluntary organizations teach trust,
tolerance, and appreciation for diversity by bringing together people of different background,
elements that are all essential in global citizenship. Putnam’s Social Capital Theory states that
6

Phillips, “Albania,” 317.
Cemal Baltaci and Reina Zenelaj, "Democracy Promotion in Albania." Electronic Journal Of Social
Sciences 12.44 (2013): 9, accessed October 3, 2013, Academic Search Premier.
8
Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert, editors, Civil Society in Democratization, (Portland: Taylor and Francis,
2004), 8. http://fairfield.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=183204.
9
Joseph Losco and Ralph Baker, Am Gov (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 3.
10
Ibid., 127.
11
Bernhard Vogel, “The formation of active civil societies in post-communist states: The challenges and
opportunities of a political foundation.” European View 7.1 (2008): 129-130, accessed December 2, 2013, doi:
10.1007/s12290-008-0022-1.
12
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America in Political Thought in America, edited by Michael B.
Levy (Illinois: Waveland Press, 1992), 300-301.
13
Ivelin Sardamov, "‘Civil Society’ and the Limits of Democratic Assistance," Government & Opposition
40.3 (2005): 379-381., doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2005.00156.x., Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost
(17392531).
14
Kenneth Newton, "Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy," International Political Science
Review 22.2 (2001): 201-202, accessed November 12, 2013, Academic OneFile.
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voluntary and citizen associations and organizations are crucial in democracy because they create
trust, social bonds, and solidarity between citizens.15 Trust is also necessary for people to have
good relations with their government and view it as legitimate. How much trust individuals have
in their government indicates how well the government is performing according to the people.16

Relationship Between Civil Society and Democracy
Mainstream theorists believe that a healthy civil society leads to democratization. As
Karatnycky writes, “It is the third sector of civic nongovernmental life that can create an
atmosphere that ensures the healthy functioning of state institutions, combats corruption, protects
respect of the rule of law, and acts as a defender of free media.”17 Scholars like Putnam and
Tocqueville say that through civil society, citizens learn skills, knowledge, and values of
democratic practices, and bring such values to government.18 Citizens then utilize these same
values in advocacy for transnational issues and engagement with institutions of global
governance. For example, such is the case when CSOs consult with major intergovernmental
organizations like the United Nations. Traditionally, civil society teaches and reinforces values
necessary to democracy and global citizenship like reciprocity, solidarity, cooperation, and
appreciation for cultures and diversity.19
Local, national, and international civil society acts as a balanced opposition to states in
favor of society. It provides a venue for people to develop ideas, agendas, and deliberate, thus
facilitating dialogue in governance, which is a main feature of democracy. Furthermore, CSOs
speak for groups of citizens, representing different sectors of society. Thus, civil society fosters
plurality, which is a necessity in democracy and in global deliberations which must represent the
diverse voices of many. Civil society is a mediator between the state and society by transmitting
interests and demands of the population to the state and to global governance institutions.20
Finally, civil society plays a “disciplinary role” for the state by forcing it to adhere to
public morality and standards of the population, eliciting accountability. According to Putnam,
the state must have autonomous institutions to check its power, and civil society provides these
institutions.21 This is especially true regarding CSOs’ role in fighting government corruption
through tools like corruption perception indexes, anti-corruption public awareness campaigns,
and education.22
There is very high correlation between civil society, democratization, and global
citizenry, but Sardamov and Green caution that civil society may not necessarily be pro15

Ibid., 206.
Newton, “Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy,” 205.
17
Adrian Karatnycky, "Making Democratization Work: Overcoming the Challenges of Political
Transitions," Harvard International Review 24.2 (2002): 54, accessed January 4, 2014, Academic Search Premier,
EBSCOhost.
18
Eric Uslaner and Gabriel Badescu, Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy (London: Routledge,
2003), 59, 125. http://fairfield.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=182240.
19
Newton, “Trust social capital, civil society, and democracy,” 4.
20
Nevila Xhindi, “The Complex Relationship Between Government and Civil Society in Albania (Twenty
Years in Focus: From 1990 till 2010). European Scientific Journal 9.17 (2013): 69-70, accessed October 20, 2013,
http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/1158/1174.
21
Uslaner and Badescu, editors, Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, 56.
22
Lejla Sadiku, “Civil society and anti-corruption: experiences from Albania, Kosovo and Serbia,”
Romanian Journal of Political Science 10.1 (2010): 34. http://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1321056573/civil-society-and-anti-corruption-experiences-from
16
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democracy, or even capture the diversity of their society.23 24 Nevertheless, this does not refute
the mainstream theory that if it has democratic principles at the core, civil society should lead to
democratization and foster global citizenship.

Global Citizenship, Democratic Value, and Good Governance
Global citizenship carries characteristics similar to those of democratic societies: a sense
of community, pluralism, appreciation for diversity (especially multicultural), civic engagement,
and advocacy among others. A global citizen identifies himself or herself with a new emerging
“global community” in addition to the local community.25 Such a global community has a set of
values, beliefs, and practices, often informed by those of mature democracies. It has emerged
through globalization and an increase in communication, transportation, and travel, as people
feel more connected with the world and different populations, regardless of geography.26 Like a
national democracy, global citizenship assumes an awareness and sense of responsibility to
issues and people, including those in different areas of the world. Both democracy and global
citizenship are associated with advocacy in national and world issues. As such, civic engagement
and civil society are essential to taking action for international causes and to finding global
solutions for such issues. In fact, some argue for the emergence of an international civil society.
Much like with traditional western democracy models, global citizenship supports rule of law,
human rights, tolerance for religious and cultural diversity, gender equality, participation and
civic engagement, environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, good governance, and
humanitarianism among other causes.27 28
A new philosophy of education, global citizenship education aims to promote such values
as peace, human rights, respect for diversity, and justice.29 An example of this global citizenship
education is the Secretary General’s Education First Initiative. In purpose and scope, it is similar
to the “Democratic Citizenship Education” model proposed by Theodore Kaltsounis, and to the
“Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights” of the Council of Europe.30 Such
initiatives aim to teach values and philosophies that would enable people to operate within their
national political system and beyond using ideals of human rights, democracy, non-violence, and
peace.
Among the many global issues of interest to global citizens, democracy and good
governance have become increasingly important causes. This is evident when examining the
numerous democratic transition efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. In fact,
“democratic governance and peaceful societies” appears a priority to global citizens, as attested

23

Sardamov, "‘Civil Society’ and the Limits of Democratic Assistance," 401.
Andrew T. Green, "Comparative Development of Post-communist Civil Societies." Europe-Asia Studies
54.3 (2002): 467, doi: 10.1080/09668130220129560, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.
25
Israel, C. Ronal. “What Does it mean to be a Global Citizen?” Kosmos: Journal for Global
Transformation. Summer 2012. http://www.kosmosjournal.org/article/what-does-it-mean-to-be-a-global-citizen/.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
United Nations Global Education First Initiative. “Priority #3: Foster Global Citizenship.” 2014.
http://www.globaleducationfirst.org/220.htm.
29
Oxfam. “Global Citizenship.” 2014. http://www.oxfam.org.uk/education/global-citizenship
30
Council of Europe. “Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights. 2014
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/edc/default_en.asp.
24
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to by the UN’s Post-2015 Development Framework and the World We Want Survey.31 As of
September 2014, this survey showed that “an honest and responsive government” ranks fourth
out of 16 top priorities voted on by over 5 million people from around the world.32 Additionally,
several international NGOs such as Freedom House and CIVICUS focus on meeting civil society
demands for good governance by supporting democratic governance in different countries and
areas. The case of democratic transitions in Albania, in Easter Europe, and in other parts of the
world fits into this context.
Movements to mainstream democratic and global citizenship values developed in the
western world as a result of historical events, conflicts, and world leaders. This was especially so
after World War Two with the emergence of international organizations and civil society.
However, Eastern European populations did not experience the rise in global citizenry, as the
iron curtain prevented them from doing so by discouraging democratic ideals and contact with
the Western word. Global citizenship relies on awareness and information of international issues
so that people may act in the global sphere. This phenomenon of international engagement was
discouraged, stifled, and in some cases like Albania, it was outlawed under the totalitarian
Communist regimes.

Authoritarianism and Democratization in Eastern Europe
Up until 1990, Eastern European countries had authoritarian regimes whose legacies
today make democratization and active global citizenship engagement difficult. In an
authoritarian government, the state determines rule of law, and there are few if any checks and
balances.33 For instance, Soviet communist regimes ruled arbitrarily through persecuting
opposition. Scholars and populations of Eastern Europe believed civil society to be key in
overthrowing dictatorships and establishing democracies in the region.34 After the Eastern
European dictatorships fell, the challenge that Albania and other Eastern European countries face
today is democratization.
Albania in particular has struggled the most with the transition to democracy because of
its exceptionally harsh dictatorship. There is a consensus among Eastern European scholars that
Albania is a unique case within Eastern Europe as it had one of the fiercest authoritarian regimes,
the highest level of isolation from the world, and the most loyal regime to the ideologies and
methods of Stalin.35 In fact, journalists, scholars, and laypeople like bloggers often make the
comparison between Albania and North Korea because of their isolation from other countries,
silencing of opposition, and feelings of near-worship towards their respective party leaders.36
Despite local and international civil society efforts, Albania’s communist history continues to
hinder its transition to democracy today.
31

UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. Realizing the Future We Want for
All: Report to the Secretary General. New York. June 2012. P. 18-19
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Post_2015_UNTTreport.pdf
32
My World 2015. “My Analytics.” My World United Nations Global Survey.
http://data.myworld2015.org/
33
Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government, 54.
34
Burnell and Calvert, editors, Civil Society in Democratization, 8.
35
Sabrina P. Ramet, editor. Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society Since 1939 (Indiana University
Press: Bloomington, 1998).
36
"Albania: Addressing the Image Problem," Economist.com. 2007.
http://www.economist.com/node/9321421
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IV. Historical Background
Repression in Communist Albania
Like other Eastern European countries, after World War II Albania adopted a communist
dictatorship. The People’s Socialist Republic of Albania rose in 1946, headed by Enver Hoxha.
Albania had arguably the most ruthless, Stalinist regime out of the Eastern European states,
perhaps with the exception of Ceausescu’s Romania.37 38 39 It had the highest percentage of
executions, imprisonment, and political exile than any other Eastern European country.40 The
state maintained control through the military, a robust omnipresent secret police (Sigurimi), and
a general reign of terror that eliminated opposition.41 The ruling party officially sentenced an
estimated 6,500 people to execution. In a population of three million people, the Communist
party imprisoned, internally-exiled, and executed about 100,000 people42 compared to
Czechoslovakia’s 65,000; Hungary’s 27,000; Poland’s 22,000.43 44 Through collective
punishment, an entire family could be internally exiled or imprisoned if one family member was
judged to be against the government. Another estimate states that 200,000 Albanians were in
prison camps at some point in their lives.45
In the 1960s, Hoxha pursued his own version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution by
severing contact with the West and other countries, closing down religious institutions,
destroying mosques and churches, and imprisoning and executing religious leaders, as well as
intellectuals in order to instill the communist values and mindset into the entire population.46 At
the end of the Cultural and Ideological Revolution, Hoxha declared Albania to be the world’s
first atheist country. Albanian communism outlawed religion and the traditional Code of Leke

37

Baltaci and Zenelaj, “Democracy Promotion in Albania,” 5.
Michael John Montias, “Communist Rule in Eastern Europe.” Foreign Affairs 43.2 (1965).
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23673/john-michael-montias/communist-rule-in-eastern-europe.
39
Stephanie Schwander-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, editors, Albanian Identities; Myth and History.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (2002), 48.
40
Lori E. Amy and Eglantina Gjermeni. “Where is the ‘State’ in Albania? The unresolved contradictions
confronting civil society in the ‘Transition’ from communism to free markets.” Studies of Transition States and
Societies 5.1 (2013): 8.
41
Robert C. Austin and Jonathan Ellison, Post-communist Transitional Justice in Albania. East European
Politics & Societies 22.2 (2008): 377. Doi: 10.1177/0888325408315768.
42
Sara Malm, “Albanian protestor turns himself into human torch in row with government over
compensation for ex-political prisoners,” MailOnline.com, October 10, 2012, Accessed December 8, 2013,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2215878/Lirak-Bejko-Albanian-protester-human-torch-row-governmentcompensation.html.
43
These figures are not entirely certain because statistics and files containing such information have been
destroyed or lost. Remaining secret police files are still closed to the public and have been tampered with. Only
estimates with large ranges are possible.
44
Scott Manning, “Communist Body Count, Historian on the Warpath, December 2006, accessed
December 2, 2013, http://www.scottmanning.com/content/communist-body-count/.
45
Aleksandra Bogdani, “Victims of Albanian Communism Struggle for Closure,” The Atlantic, December
7, 2012, accessed December 2, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/victims-ofalbanian-communism-struggle-for-closure/265956/
46
Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw. Albania: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of
Congress,1994), accessed December 3, 2013, http://countrystudies.us/albania/index.htm.
38
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Dukagji.47 It persecuted Albanian tribe leaders in an attempt to rid the country of what it called
barbarism of tribes and clans.48 The regime instituted a strict ban on private property and forced
collective land work. It propagandized against other countries, peoples, cultures, and societies,
especially western nations like the US.
While other regimes in Eastern Europe were opening up after the 1970s, Hoxha pursued
an isolationist policy and tightened control of Albanians. The country cut off relations with
Yugoslavia, the USSR, and China after accusing them of betraying the ideals of MarxismLeninism. Albania’s isolationist ideology, “Hoxhaism,” 49 became increasingly totalitarian.
Exiting or entering the country was illegal, making international contact nearly impossible for
Albanian citizens. By the late 1980s, Albania was experiencing mass deterioration in standards
of living as a result of its attempted autarky. With worse resource shortages than Romania,
Albanians were pushed to survival limits until the regime fell.50
At the same time, the methods of silencing opposition during Socialism threatened any
notion of civil society, especially global civil society. The government banned any contact with
the international world, including listening to foreign music, radio, or watching foreign
television. It attempted to construct a strict “Albanian” Communist identity. The government’s
formula for eliminating opposition through “state terror” created a “unique communist mentality
in Albania” that thwarted organized resistance like through CSOs.51 By law, formal
institutionalized group association was a criminal act, and those who engaged in it were
imprisoned. This is partly why formal civil society opposition movements like Solidarity and
Charter 77 rose in other Eastern Europe states but not in Albania. About one third of Albanians
experienced secret police harassment or were in labor camps.52 A history of fear and threat by
the regime made open and collective dissention via civil society virtually impossible. In addition,
the government created its own associations to squash independent civil society, such as through
forced volunteering. It used professional and vocational schools to inculcate obedience and the
Communist values (against a bourgeois culture) into the people.53
Nevertheless, some form of civil society activity continued to barely survive in the
private sphere as citizens retreated from the public sphere. As McFadden says, civil society
survived in Stalinist regimes despite totalitarianism because rulers never quite succeeded in
extinguishing it.54 Civil society acted through literature, culture, and hidden religion. Writers and
poets, like Ismail Kadare,55continued to express some free thinking using allegories and
concealed meanings. In the home, some Albanians practiced religion and listened to western
radio in secret against the law.56
Fall of the Communist Regime and Transition to Democracy
47

The Code of Leke Dukagji, written by a Catholic Albanian nobleman, defined traditional law and
conduct of the household, the community, and tribes.
48
De Waal, Clarissa, Albania Today: A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence (New York: I.B.
Tauris&Co Ltd, 2007), 5.
49
Baltaci and Zenelaj, “Democracy Promotion in Albania,” 4.
50
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Democratization Without Decommunization: The Balkans Unfinished
Revolutions." Romanian Journal of Political Science 5.1 (2005): 15, accessed October 28, 2013, Academic Search
Premier, EBSCOhost (17862594).
51
Amy and Gjermeni, “Where is the State in Albania?” 30.
52
Austin and Ellison, editors, “Post-Communist Transitional Justice in Albania,” 397.
53
Baltaci and Zenelaj, “Democracy Promotion in Albania,” 5.
54
Dr. David McFadden, interview by Klevisa Kovaci, Fairfield University, October 8, 2013.
55
Award-winning author and nominee for the Nobel Prize in Literature.
56
De Waal, Albania Today: A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 4.
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Albania was the last country to exit the totalitarian system, and in 1991 it opened up to
democracy with overwhelming support from Albanians. Ramiz Alia succeeded Hoxha in 1985
and relaxed rules for travel, contact with other countries, and free association. Contact with
different countries became permissible. Due to internal pressure, in 1990 Alia established a
multi-party system for the first time, thus opposition could finally organize. Albanians, inspired
by the international events in the countries and societies around them, harnessed the values of
democracy and acted upon them. After seeing the surrounding totalitarian governments fall
around them, students and masses in Albania began demonstrations against their own regime.
Law and order broke down, and agencies could no longer contain the protesters or destruction of
state property. By 1990, there was mass economic breakdown: food rations and bread lines.
Mass exodus occurred as Albanians crossed over to Greece and Italy.57
In 1991, the remnant of the Albanian state called for an election. The Labor Party, later
named Socialist Party, led by Fatos Nano won through manipulation. But demonstrations, riots
and economic breakdown forced it to resign. Protests began in the north, a traditionally
anticommunist area, and spread to the capital, Tirana. Fatos Nano’s government fell and the first
democratic government in Albania came into being during the “Third Wave” of democracies in
the world.
In March 1992, the Democratic Party won elections. While the new government worked
to establish order, there was still a lack of rule of law while lootings and destruction of
infrastructure continued. As structural adjustment policies of the IMF and international economic
institutions prescribed, Albania immediately underwent a rapid transformation through
decentralization and neoliberalism to distance itself as far as possible from its prior commandcontrol economy. Privatization was accompanied by corruption and little media or public
scrutiny.58 Global financial institutions promoting capitalism and liberal economics hailed
“shock therapy” in Albania and pointed to its high GDP growth. However, international actors
failed to recognize dangerous trends behind this deregulation: high unemployment, a remittance
rate of over 20 percent fueling the GDP, uncontrolled migration, alienation of societal groups,
organized international crime and corruption.59 According to Kajsiu, this rapid privatization and
deregulation was the price that people were willing to pay to shake off the communist past.60
Despite warnings, global actors were shocked when Albania almost disintegrated into civil war
in 1997.
In the Pyramid Scheme of 1997, about two thirds of Albanians invested money and life
savings into the private embezzled investment scheme in order to gain wealth. When the pyramid
collapsed, Albanians lost $1.2 billion in US dollars in total.61 People reacted in violent uprisings
against the state, which they believe to be associated with the scam. As the state was fast
collapsing and gangs took over cities, Berisha declared a state of emergency. About 2,000 people
were killed during this conflict.62 The UN Security Council sent foreign forces to restore order in
Albania and monitor elections in 1997.
57

Ibid., 6.
Sadiku, “Civil society and anti-corruption: experiences from Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia,” 45.
59
Ibid., 45.
60
Blendi Kajsiu, “Down with politics: The crisis of representation in post-communist Albania,” East
European Politics & Societies 24.2 (2010): 237, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (49758689).
61
Christopher Jarvis, “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes,” International Monetary Fund,
Finance and Development 37.1 (2000). Accessed January 4, 2014,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm.
62
Ibid.
58
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The 1997 emergency elections brought into power the Socialist Party, which continued
neoliberal reforms. Despite the catastrophe of mass deregulation, people still favored a liberal
economy in order to transition away from the Communist legacy of state controlled economy.
The 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis brought further strain on the weak Albanian economy as over
400,000 Kosovar refugees sought refuge in Albania.63 This crisis placed a focus on the values of
humanitarianism, as well as peace and conflict among Albanians. While winning Albania
acclaim for its welcome of the refugees, the crisis exacerbated Albania’s economic troubles.
Throughout all these developments, institutionalized Albanian and international civil society
organizations rose for the first time and are now charged with the task of alleviating the above
struggles, as well as with transforming Albania into a strong democracy with an informed and
active global citizenry.

Rise of Civil Society
In the early 1990s, the fall of neighboring communist regimes incited Albanian students,
human rights groups, and some previous communists against the old regime. Protests in Albania
were anarchic rather than organized because the Secret Police was still active. Some scholars and
journalists make the case that Albanian communism fell, not because of authentic grassroots
movements which had been brewing for decades like in the more liberal Eastern European states,
but because Albanians became aware of the fall of all other dictatorships around them and faced
the worst economic degradation in Europe. This is similar to the domino fall of authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East in 2011, fueled by an international civil society that called upon the
ideals of freedom, and democracy. Once protests began, the government could no longer
preserve itself.64 In 1991, protesters effectively forced the newly “elected” Socialist Party to
resign. Civil society was finally being revived through mass protests, and, for the first time,
through rising formal associations.
After 1990, hundreds of NGOs and civil society groups opened up in Albania, largely due
to the influence of international CSOs. During the decentralization period, the state withdrew and
could not address human rights abuses, violence against women, trafficking, and other issues.
Therefore civil society organizations formed to fill the void. 65 66 Meanwhile international CSOs
moved into Albania to address the humanitarian crises, such as those involving refugees. They
first worked with human rights and social issues like women and children’s rights, illiteracy,
poverty, and health care.
Throughout the early to mid-1990s, the relationship between government and civil
society was very weak. Civil society actors hesitated to work with the state because of its hostile
attitude towards independent journalists, the press, and opposition. The legal status of CSOs in
Albania improved as the government passed laws legitimizing and supporting their existence.
For instance, the Civil Code of 1994 further improved the legal basis for NGOs, but prevented
them from engaging in economic activities, hindering them economically.67
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From 1997-2005 civil society in Albania grew significantly in mission, scope, funding,
and visibility with foreign aid and support from the US and other western countries. Hundreds of
NGOs registered with the state, many of them international. In 1997, NGOs supported by
international donors focused on emergency aid and relief. Afterwards, they began to train
political figures and civil society leaders in democracy. One large project that taught democratic
citizenship education was Kaltsounis’s Democratic Education Project, a partnership between
USAID, University of Washington, the Albanian Ministry of Education, Albanian universities,
and the George Soros Foundation. CSOs began forming coalitions and partnering more
frequently with government on legislation.
Figure 1: Mapping Albanian Civil Society

(CIVICUS 2010, 11)
From 2002-2005, with the influence of international agencies, CSOs in Albania worked
to improve governance via political development. For instance, civil society assumed the role of
monitoring elections. NGOs worked with the government to initiate the 2001 Albanian Coalition
against Corruption Plan on Anti-Corruption Awareness.68 Awareness of NGOs which help to
progress democracy and good governance, have increased over the past few years.69 Such CSOs
include the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) and Mjaft!, a youth-led NGO that
tackles political and social problems in Albania.
In the mid to late 2000s, the Albanian government and civil society collaborated
somewhat more on policy. Parliament consulted with civil society, private sector leaders, trade
unions, and academics to formulate the 2007 National Strategy for Development and Integration.
In 2009, government established the Civil Society Support Fund (CSSA) to encourage
68
69
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development of civil society, although funding is perpetually low.70 Civil society helped form the
Social Inclusion Strategy in 2008 to make social inclusion a high priority in Albania.71

V. Weak Democracy and Low Civil Society Impact in Democratization
Figure 2: Key Indicators of Albanian Democracy

(CIVICUS 2011, 164)
Now open and even welcoming to internationalism, Albanians strongly support
democracy, and Albania has made efforts to transition to a democracy with the help of
international actors. In less than 25 years, Albania managed to transform from the most
repressive totalitarian system to a partly free democracy with an arguably free market system.
But even though Albanian democracy has greatly improved since its inception in 1990, it still has
major flaws. In Albania, there is little experience with democratic culture and thus democracy in
Albania struggles today. As Figure 2 shows, Albania is categorized as a hybrid regime that is
only partly free. Its main governmental deficiencies are in rule of law and corruption, including
major organized crime such as human trafficking. The judiciary lacks independence and is prone
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to manipulation by the executive
ecutive branch and political parties.72 According to the Freedom House
Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores, since 2000 Albania has stagnated in key aspects
of democratization while worsening in others.73 The indicators on Figure 2 show that Albanian
democracy today struggles.. Albania has lower scores on the above indicators when compared
with other Eastern European countries.
Figure 3: Perception of CSO Impact74

(CIVICUS 2010, 21)

The perceived impact of civil society in Albania is also low. In Figure 4, about half of
Albanians surveyed feel that CSOs make a relevant contribution to political and social changes.75
As illustrated in Figure 3, the general Albanian population is more skeptical than CSO workers
towards the positive impact of CSOs in political and social change. Vurmo says that Albanian
civil society is “struggling to add value to national transformation efforts,” 76 let alone to global
change. CSOs have likewise had mixed success in pushing government account
accountability
ability and
transparency. On the other hand, the area where civil society has the made most impact is in
social and human rights, a key element in democracy and in global citizenship. In fact,
associations have worked to develop a family code, laws on dome
domestic
stic violence, and gender
equality - many of these issues are also priorities of global citizenship. Yet, despite the high
number of organizations working with human rights, there have been little results in social issues
like domestic violence and nondisc
nondiscrimination
rimination in Albania, as both continue at high levels.77 Areas
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where civil society has had weak impact in helping to democratize Albania and inculcate global
citizenship values include civic engagement, democratic governance, and rule of law.78
Figure 4: Civil Society Index Diamond for Albania 2009

(CIVICUS 2010, 1)

VI. Shortcomings of Civil Society: Communist Legacy in Political Culture
Lack of Democratic and Global Citizenship Values and Skills
The above weaknesses in civil society and its work towards pushing Albania for
democracy are best explained by the cultural legacy of Albania’s dictatorship. Perhaps
Communism’s most detrimental legacy to democracy is a political culture almost opposite that of
a democratic one with an active citizenry in national and international issues. Albanians very
much supported the decision to switch to democracy, but Albanian society and leadership did not
have the tools, knowledge, and political culture to realize democracy effectively. So democracy
promotion
romotion mainly came from the outside, especially Westerners working in Albania.79
Albanians, and even elites, did not know what their human, social, economic, and political rights
were. Democratic concepts and processes like government accountability, institutional
itutional
transparency, and compromise in legislation were alien to Albanians because the previous
government functioned in violation of them. Albanians also had very little experience with
global citizenship ideals such as human rights and environmental ssustainability,
ustainability, again due to
being closed off from such ideas in other parts of the world during communism. This isolationist,
authoritarian experience stands in contrast to Kaltsounis’s Democratic Citizenship Education and
Global Citizenship Education, which both aim to train citizens with values of peace, dialog,
human rights, and awareness of global issues.
78
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Moreover, Albanians’ concept of the “common good” during communism differs greatly
from the democratic meaning of this term. As Kaltsounis writes, in a democratic society, people
work together to deliberate and determine the “common good” through a consensus of what is
best for society regarding freedom and human rights. Likewise, the “common good” in global
citizenship represents the well-being of the planet and of members in different societies, in
alignment with international human rights and development frameworks. Meanwhile, the
Albanian Labor Party defined the “common good” in terms of the masses working for the
Communist Party, whose members obtained great wealth while the common people experienced
poverty.80 The education system pre-1990 propagated the Communist definition of the common
good. More than any other European country, Communist Albania was “fundamentally
committed, nationally and internationally, to a hard “Marxist-Leninist” policy.” 81 It mimicked
oppressive and even dehumanizing values and methods of Stalin, which inevitably contradict a
free democracy that respects human rights.
The communist regime left a value legacy that makes democratization very difficult for
civil society today. As Feilcke-Tiemann writes, communism placed Albania in extreme isolation
with no experience with democracy.82 Most Albanian adults today have little experience with
democratic and global citizenry norms and skills, having grown up for most of their lives in an
isolationist system that abused or negated democratic values and freedoms. The political culture
during communism perpetuated a mentality of stereotypes, simplification, and dichotomous
thinking, especially about other peoples and cultures.83 Thus critical thinking of Albanians and
analysis of social and political issues is not very rich. Albanians were politically socialized by
the Communist Party into a culture of separateness, authoritarianism, unquestionable obedience,
fear, and distrust. People still are not skilled at deliberating and respectfully challenging other
ideas because during autocracy, such independent thinking and expression was prohibited.
People sacrificed democratic ideas of fairness, trust, and decency to survive under the
government’s iron fist.84 Albania’s new “hybrid regime,” has the formal characteristics of
democracy, but it lacks liberal standards and still functions using old communist mentalities.85
But, Mungiu-Pippidi makes clear that no Eastern European state can have true democratization
without “decommunization,” as the legacies of communism are powerful and harmful to
democracy.86
The political elite governing the country today were educated and socialized under the
rule of the Communist or Labor Party 87, and thus they demonstrate similar mindset and habits as
during the old regime, which is unhealthy for a democracy.88 Even though political parties
wanted to destroy communist remnants in the system, they were not trained for such a regime
80
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overhaul, as they were all educated under communism.89 The new political parties following the
fall of communism were made up of former communists. Politicians, governmental leaders, and
Albanians grew up in a society with no democratic political culture so what occurs in the
Albanian public sphere is “elite reproduction, not elite replacement.” 90 For this reason, many
Albanians today believe that democracy, and a will for national and global engagement will
develop in Albania when the current generation of political and civil society leaders leaves and a
new generation of Albanians enters; new leaders who are better experienced with Western
democratic political culture.91 Others look to the diaspora from Western states to return and bring
democratic values and skills to the country.92 Trained internationally in societies where global
citizenship ideals have already taken root, this diaspora may present hope in diffusing democratic
and global responsibility into Albanian citizens.
The lack of democratic values inherited from a period of autocracy cripples CSOs today.
As these democratic values parallel those of global citizenship, their absence in Albania also
negatively impacts the development of global citizenry there. Vurmo notes that civil society in
Albania is not always run using clear standards for ethics and transparency, two essential pillars
of democratic values.93 The CIVICUS 2010 report echoes this concern and adds that CSOs in
Albania lag in transparency, accountability, and democratic decision-making to set example for
democratic governance. Similarly, these are all elements that were absent during communist rule
in Albania. 38 percent of CSOs leaders surveyed believe that the third sector experiences
corruption.94 Over 50 percent of them think that civil society does not have enough transparency.
Out of people who were surveyed from outside of the CSOs, 56.25 percent said that “most CSOs
lack transparency.” 95 For example, low transparency in CSOs is evident because many are hard
to reach by e-mail and reluctant to share information about finances and evaluations. Even
USAID has said that civil society organizations in Albania need to communicate their activities
to the public more effectively.96 The fact that CSOs continue to work in somewhat undemocratic
manners and adhere to practices from the old regime make it slower for democratic change to
take place.

Trust Deficit
One of the main legacies of the Communist regime that has hindering the
democratization process via civil society in Albania is a lack of trust and community within the
Albanian population. During Communism, the state pitted citizens, neighbors, and friends
against one another and against foreigners through forcing complicity for survival. In Albania, a
quarter of citizens worked for the secret police to report treason against neighbors.97 98 Strangers
89
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were not to be trusted, for anyone could be working for the government. Even near the end of
Communism, people from other cou
countries
ntries were to be eschewed, for fear of the government
accusing the Albanian of being in complicity with foreigners. The resulting low sense of
community among Albanians renders Albanians less likely to identify with a broader
international community towards
ds common goals. In Albania, there also exists a low level of
confidence in political and social institutions. The older generations still use conspiracy theories
to analyze political events and government decision. 99 The proclivity for conspiracy theories
came about from living under a secret
secret, oppressive regime in which the state did not justify its
actions and where people speculated to try to understand its workings. Distrust and paranoia are
still present today in Albania.
There is an overall lack of trust in CSOs, political institutions, political parties,
parliament, and politicians.100 On a survey about trust among 28 Eastern and Central European
countries, Albania ranked lowest; the
he only Eastern European citizens with less faith in their
politicians
iticians than Albanians are Greeks and Croatians.101 When surveyed, 92.5 percent of
Albanians said that one must be very careful in dealing with people and only 7.5 percent say that
people can be trusted.102 Again, tthis distrust is a result of living under an abusive political rule
where the Communist Party governed arbitrarily and forced people into complicity with the
secret police.
Figure 5: Summary of Trust and group Membership in the West and Former Communist States

(Uslaner and Badescu 2013, 89)
As a consequence of this lack of trust and social capital, most Albanians today want to
engage in neither national nor international politics, thus reflecting Newton and Putnam’s belief
that deteriorated trust harms the development of civ
civil
il society. Albanians, like other post-socialist
post
populations highly distrust formalized and institutionalized organizations because during the
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authoritarian times organizations like these were used to coerce loyalty to the Communist
Party.103 As Figure 5 shows, lack of trust directly correlates with lower participation in CSOs.
Citizens of Eastern European countries which have the least amount of trust because of their
experience with communism, also show the least amount of involvement in CSOs.
Volunteer CSOs face impediments in their present work to democratize Albania because
Albanians may associate them with negative connotations of institutionalized “volunteer” work
that was forced upon them under communism.104 However, democratic and global advocacy is
dependent upon volunteer engagement. Meanwhile, the totalitarian system, volunteerism and
civil society had no true definition because the government combined public and private spheres;
civil society was not truly independent of the state. Today, Albanians distrust political parties
and labor unions the most, as these had historically represented the Communist Party. Likewise
organizations of international scope did not exist because they were forbidden, so Albanians had
little experience with the world beyond their borders. Albanians trust religious, humanitarian,
and women’s organizations slightly more. The institutions that Albanians trust most are
international and supranational governance bodies like the EU, UN, and NATO, which are not
part of Albanian civil society.105 This trend shows that Albanians actually trust other countries
and international institutions more than their own government and organizations. Yet, it does not
mean, that a strong sense of global citizenship exists within Albania, as international institutions
of global governance work mainly with the Albanian government rather than with the Albanian
people through a bottom-up approach. They do not directly mobilize the Albanian population for
involvement in national democratization or international issues.

Antipolitics Discourse
There exists in Albania an “antipolitics discourse” that has brewed since the failures of
the previous and current governments to represent the people. In an ideal democracy described
by Locke and Tocqueville, citizens should have faith in their institutions and be engaged in the
political and civil processes. Today, such trust in institutions should also mean that citizens can
use their government for advocacy regarding global issues of concern. Contrastingly, in Albania
politics and CSOs analyzing national and global politics have become segregated from daily life
and the masses. Politics and advocacy, whether national or international, are a separate sphere of
activity for politicians, intellectuals, and analysts who function as translators of politics because
the people are no longer presumed to understand politics on their own. Albanians today tend to
stay away from politics and collective action in a phenomenon in which politics has become the
“other” against “the people.” 106
Moreover, public opinion of Albanians towards politics and civic engagement is
negative. Because of their history with communism, Albanians today have a “kind of politicsphobia,” 107 and they see politics as an evil in itself and corrupt by nature.108 Just as there existed
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a gap between the majority of the population and the few elite leaders of the Communist Party,
the same phenomenon of people separated from politics exists today. As the Communist Party
and today’s political parties did not represent Albanians, people have turned against the parties
and politicians. About 70 percent of Albanians in 2003 thought that political parties either do not
serve the public interest, or serve it very little, staying consistent with the low public approval
ratings.109
Another part of the reason why politics are viewed in such a negative light in Albanian
society is that political parties unsuccessfully tried to represent the people as masses against
communism. After the fall of communism, parties claimed to represent “the people” under a fake
democratic ideal and protect them from external threat, usually communism. This approach put
all individuals of different classes and needs into the same category of “the people,” ignoring
diverse existing socioeconomic, religious, and gender groups. Ironically, this is exactly how
communism qualified and defined the population by failing to recognize and work with different
groups. Such a generalized treatment of the entire population contradicts a democracy and the
spirit of internationalism, where all different groups are to be acknowledged and play a viable
part in their own governance (plurality or group theory). Throughout the 1990s, the Democratic
Party engaged in an anticommunist discourse to distract the population from lack of economic
development and infighting.110 The Democratic Party’s concept of “the people” against
communism meant to bring together (against the previous dictatorship) groups that may have
otherwise been in opposition with one another or with the government.. The anticommunist
discourse also aimed to distract the population from an unaccountable government, troubling
economy, and the daily problems that the people faced, such as poverty and violence.
Counteractively, this negative campaign and hysteria further polarized people from the public
sphere and fueled Albanians’ contempt for government and organizations. It created an adverse
outlook towards government and efforts to bolster the new democracy.

Low Civic Engagement, Apathy
During the communist regime, Albanians developed passive and neutral attitudes towards
public and civic engagement, which carry on to today’s emerging democracy. Figure 4 points out
that today, the lowest score of Albanian civil society is in civic engagement. Many Albanians
have “high level indifference” and “widespread apathy” when it comes to taking action in the
public sphere.111 There is no strong philanthropic, volunteer, or international advocacy culture
because people distrust or are apathetic towards NGOs. Consequently, Albanians are less willing
to support NGOs.112
Apathy resulting from the communist regime is largely responsible for the low level of
civic engagement. The Communist Party forced people to mobilize in support of the party, using
top-down institutions. This coercion resulted in a lack of desire and even fear of involving
oneself in the government’s “civil society” and volunteerism. By the time of Hoxha’s death in
1985, the Albanian population had become “largely dispirited and apathetic.”113 The majority of
109
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Albanians’ attitude of passivity partly formed as a result of the government making almost all
decisions for them, including career and housing for families. It may have also been a defense
mechanism against arbitrary threats from the government. Meanwhile, the absence of freedom to
choose and associate freely contributed to a general sense of hopelessness and futility. During
the communist period, rather than working with the governmental system to reform it, citizens
withdrew into private networks of families, the aspect of life which was least touched by the
state. Private networks, like family relationships, became more trusted than democratic voluntary
networks.114 To this day, Albanians closely trust private relations with family (including
extended family) and friends, but tend to avoid the public sphere of Albanian and international
civil society and politics. Yet, passivity (or hostility) towards the public sphere is detrimental to
an emerging democracy, which requires that people voice their opinions and be actively involved
in shaping policies that affect them. It is not conducive to global citizenship because
international advocacy relies upon people’s awareness and active engagement in local, national,
and international events and issues.
The low level of civic engagement in Albania is also due to the Albanians’ unfamiliarity
the third sector because such a concept was part of the public sphere of the government during
communism. When NGOs first began moving to Albania or opening up there immediately after
the fall of communism, Albanians did not understand their role, nor did they trust them, let alone
desire to become involved. Many Albanians also worry about transparency and donor agenda of
CSOs.
Civil society’s largest deficiency in Albania is civic engagement. Today only 18 percent
of Albanians say they are active members of social or voluntary organizations, while about 28
percent participate in individual activism (like signing petitions or demonstrating).115 Citizens
feel that the only way to have a say in the government is by voting. Some Albanians fail to
recognize the value in action beyond voting, such as by joining volunteer organizations or
advocating for a cause. On their part, Albanian and international CSOs have not worked to
mobilized the Albanian population in volunteerism and politics. Similarly, the intellectual elites
have not been involved in leading civil society and bringing it to the mass population.116 CSOs
have made little effort to try to engage citizens in their projects or to develop an active citizenry.
Reporters and scholars like Xhindi and Kaltsounis make the case that NGOs need to raise more
awareness about the significance and benefits of civic engagement, because there is not enough
outreach and communication to invite citizens to participate in civic life. There is a gap between
CSOs and the masses; there exists little interchange, dialogue, and knowledge exchange between
the two.117 118
Acceptance of Authoritarian Governance
A dangerous legacy of communism in Albania is a political culture that is accepting of an
authoritarian system of governance. As Mungiu-Pippidi says “Albania has still the strongest
former Communists, and therefore the greatest contestation, which shows in the fact that
Albanians, unlike in the other countries, still identify political conflict as the number one source
114
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of social conflict.”119 Since its inception through the Constitution, the new government gave the
executive branch in Albania’s new democracy too much influence over the other branches, even
though the new government was supposed to be a parliamentary republic.120 The strength of the
political party and executive branch leaves little independence to courts and police officers,
which makes for a difficult atmosphere for pro-democracy reformers.121 Party and government
leadership continues to be authoritarian through hierarchies that discourage or sometimes
threaten dissention. Hoxha purged many members and top officials within the Communist Party
and administration because he saw them as threats. In the same manner, political parties in
Albania post-1992 eliminated dissidents within their own party and opponents from the
competing parties. In fact, the Democratic Party used the 1995 law on "On Genocide and Crimes
Against Humanity Committed in Albania during the Communist Regime for Political,
Ideological and Religious Motives" opportunely to silence opposition rather than for posttransitional justice.122
Although the Albanian government today does not use force as it did during the
totalitarian period, it still constitutes an acceptance of violence in maintaining control. Albanian
political culture among government leaders and the population to some extent condones
authoritarian practices As Fischer writes, “some aspects of its [Albania’s] authoritarian rule live
on: the elite’s general disregard for the well-being of the people and for the best interests of the
state, brutal and intolerant politics, and the lack of a rule of law.”123 To illustrate, politicians,
legislators, and senior officials often have their own bodyguards who fire and hire customs
officers and other officials. Politicians use coercion and blackmail to meet their goals.124 While
Albanians now have civil rights, the practice of torture persists. The current authoritarian
governance style in Albania is an inheritance of the Communist regime, and therefore the
process of “decommunization,” which Mungiu-Pippidi explains, has not succeeded in Albania.
The use of force and authoritarian methods to maintain power is counterproductive to a
democracy and global dialog, which require discourse instead of force, and plurality of voices
instead of silencing of voices.
Moreover, manipulation of elections by political parties show an adherence to old
political values and is another detriment to democracy left over by the old regime. The Socialist
and Democratic parties intimidated the judiciary and media, contested election results, and
thwarted government operations if they were denied power. The willingness to succumb to
almost any means in order to win elections comes from the previous government, in which loss
of political power was disastrous. It is difficult for Albanian politicians to adjust to a democratic
sharing of power with minority parties and accept electoral loss and succession after living for in
a regime that annihilated opponents through mass purges by the secret police.
In general, rule of law, a prime component of democracy, is weak and corruption high
(more so than in the other western Balkan countries). This presents major challenges to civil
society in its efforts to press for democratization. During communism, the undisputed law was
what the Communist Party dictated. Likewise, today the state is identified with the party in
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power instead of the rule of the Constitut
Constitution.125 Politicians interfere on judiciary rulings. As
Baltaci and Zenelaj indicate, “what remained most alarming were Berisha’s inclinations to
change the rules of the political game when they did not suit him.”126 Corruption leads to
disputed leaders of state,
e, uneven distribution of public goods, state capture, public procurement,
procurement
and condoning of organized crime
crime.127 This personalization of institutions comes from living in a
system that thrived on such tactics. Today a lack of respect for rule of law has enabled
enabl organized
crime of human
man trafficking and drug trade. C
Corruption creates an extremely difficult environment
for CSOs to operate in. Weak rule of law undermines democracy and contradict
contradictss values of global
citizenship. The
he enormous challenge
challenges of corruption, organized crime, and lack or rule of law
greatly impede civil society’s
’s work today. 128 These problems are of such
ch a large scale that it is
very difficult for civil society to tackle them without adequate collaboration with the government
and justice system.
Figure 6: Albania Democracy and Civil Society Scores129

Freedom House
(2012, 47)
Figure 6 of the Freedom House chart illustrates several points already made about the
weak level of democracy and civil society. It confirms stagnation or worsening of corruption,
democratic governance, media independence, and strength of civil society.130 The higher the
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score between 1 to 7 appears, the lower the level of Albania’s democratic progress is. From 2003
to 2012, most of the democracy indicator scores for Albania increased or remained the same,
revealing less progress with each year.
Like in the Albanian government, CSOs sometime also feature a top-down hierarchy in
administration with strong power concentrated at the top. In the CIVICUS Report, 48 percent of
CSOs made decisions through appointed leaders, or an appointed board rather than
democratically through elected leaders, staff, and members.131 Hirst argues that civil society
organizations contain an authoritarian hierarchical structure that limit freedom and give power to
the few elites who control the organization.132 This is the case with many NGOs in Albania.
The authoritarian and hierarchical nature of institutions involved in the public sphere is
also present in the highly centralized education system. The way that decisions in university
departments are taken is not typically democratic. Few educators participate in the deliberation
of curricula, whereas a few leaders make the majority of the decisions about curricula with the
input of the state. This decision-making process allows little chance for interaction and dialogue,
going directly against decentralization and de-politization in the education system, which are
important for democratic and global citizenship education. In the past, government’s say in the
curriculum interfered with deliberation and did not allow civil society actors adequate freedom in
designing curricula.133

VII. Shortcomings in Civil Society: External Environment
The external environment in which civil society operates can hinder civil society
initiatives in democratizing Albania’s government. External environment refers to the political,
social, economic, and cultural setting where CSOs operate and where civic engagement takes
place. In 2013, Albania scored 55 on the Enabling Environment Index134, and ranked 52 out of
109 countries. The only Eastern European countries ranking below Albania were Serbia, Bosnia,
and Kosovo.135 Reports like the CIVICUS assessment of civil society in Albania say that the
Albanian third sector functions in a “generally enabling environment,” but that CSOs do not
consult regularly with the people or government in policy. In addition, there is a gap between
CSOs and the masses because little interchange, dialogue, and knowledge exchange takes place
between CSOs and the rest of Albanians.136 Gjipali comments, “Albania’s civil society sector
remains weak and struggles to find space for meaningful activity in a highly politicized
environment.”137
Looking at the political environment, the government in Albania harbors distrust towards
civil society. Like new Eastern European democracies, Albania’s government faces the difficulty
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of encouraging civil society without allowing it to challenge the legitimacy of new
democratically elected institutions.138 The Albanian government is still weary of bringing civil
society into governance, such as in global issues of concern like environmentalism, for fear of
opposition. Historically, the Communist state banned independent civil society because of the
threat it would present to the state’s power. As Kuti writes, “governments did not trust
[associations] at all, the most dictatorial ones even tried to completely eradicate them.139 Like
during communism, today those who want to change the system are intimidated and kept out of
influence by the state while anti-corruption rules become empty.140 The government still
intimidates journalists and free press. While there is much more freedom in civil society today
than during the Communist regime, present government distrust of civil society partly originate
from the negative interaction between the two in the past. The government sees civil society as a
check, or rather a threat, to its power.

Legal Framework and Relations with the State
The relationship between civil society and government continues to have tension through
the legal framework of civil society, that is, the registration procedures for CSOs, taxation
treatment, and pathways for CSO input in governance. Albania lacks clear and formal
developed pathways for the involvement of civil society with Parliament, like via
consultation.141 In fact, few NGOs work routinely with government to prepare laws; as
mentioned, there does exist a partnership between government and civil society, but it is small
even with municipal governments, let alone national government of issues of global
importance. In cases where CSOs do provide input in legislation the state is not always
receptive to it.142 Seventy-five percent of CSOs in Albania reported that they did in fact push
for policy change in the last year, but only 38 percent of them said that they were successful.
This indicates that there must be barriers to advocacy.143 Laws governing CSOs often impede
civil society in post-communist countries. Even where laws allow for the protection of
Albanian and international CSOs, the rules are not always enforced. Some Albanian civil
society leaders and heads of CSOs experience unfair treatment and even harassment from the
state.144 Thirty-nine percent of surveyed CSO leaders believed that the legal framework is
restricting for CSOs and 28 percent of leaders reported that they experienced illegitimate
restrictions from their local or central government.145 In this sense, government directly
obstructs the work and project of NGOs and their leaders. Overall 56 percent of CSOs judge
the interaction between civil society and state to be limited.146
Another problem to civil society impacting democracy in Albania is that after 2005 some
civil society leaders leave the third sector to work in government. Some civic activists believe
that they can only make an impact by working in government, and in 2011 many ran for
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office.147 The loss of civil society leadership to the state weakens and contributes to the
deficiency in human resources of CSOs. As a result, some NGOs no longer continue
functioning or many lose donor funding. Counterintuitively, the move of CSO leaders to the
public sector is not conductive to democracy because there is no spillover effect to the
government from former CSO leaders who have been trained using democratic values. Their
democratic training and values corresponding with those of global civil society do not “take
root” in the transitioning democracy through their new work in the public sphere.148 On the
contrary, CSO workers who enter into the government environment begin to play by the rules
of politics,149 which reverses the NGO teachings in democratic and global citizenship. These
blurred lines between the public and third sector create even more distrust of CSOs in the eyes
of Albanians,150 who view this phenomenon as collusion between the two.
Next, the lack of financial viability of CSOs also leaves them open to manipulation by
political parties.151 Some think tanks focusing on democracy and international affairs affiliated
themselves with political parties post-1997, thus no longer produced authentic research.152
Independence is especially an issue with media where there exists a triangle between the media,
parties, and business. Newspapers often align along political party lines. Deviation or attack of
major parties can lead to physical assault or shut down of a media outlet. Investigative
reporting like “naming and shaming” is relatively new in Albania, although certainly
increasing.153

Sustainability: Civil Society as Driven by Outside Donors
Civil society has been inefficient in spurring democracy in Albania because it is not
entirely a grass-roots initiative like the volunteer associations that Tocqueville observed in the
US, or like the advocacy of global citizens. Since the Albanian population is hesitant to work
with civil society associations due to its troubling experience with communism, foreigners have
mainly promoted civil society development within Albania. International agencies and a few
Albanian elites impose certain goals, approaches, and projects instead of gathering information
and input from the people about which goals and approaches are most important for them. On
their part, Albanians do not articulate their issues or agendas to CSOs due to a lack of
engagement and trust towards CSOs, as already discussed. A top-down approach by CSO cannot
substitute grassroots-led action that a democracy and global citizenship require to tackle issues
important to the public. These movements must be led through ground initiatives from people
educated in social, economic, and political issues of their community and abroad. Current
bottom-up initiatives are not widespread and strong enough to support democracy and an
emerging global citizenship in Albania.

147

Gjipaili, “Albania,” Freedom House, 49.
Amy and Gjermeni, “Where is the State in Albania?” 13-14.
149
Ibid., 13-14.
150
CIVICUS “Civil Society Profile: Albania,” 164.
151
Adam Fagan and Indraneel Sircar, Promoting Democracy in the Western Balkans after the Global
Financial Crisis, LSE The European Institute: Research on South Eastern Europe (2012): 27.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48036/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_LSEE_Papers%20on%20South%20Eastern%20Europ
e_Promoting%20Democracy%28author%29.pdf.
152
Amy and Gjermeni, “Where is the State in Albania?” 9.
153
Sadiku, “Civil society and anti-corruption: experiences from Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia,” 14-15, 48.
148

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss1/2

24

Kovaci: Democracy in Albania

Another main environment reason for the failure of NGOs to radically bring about
democratization is that CSOs in Albania are, for the most part, not financially sustainable.154
CSOs in Albania do not have a great amount of financial capacity. During communism, Albania
had the worst economic breakdowns,
reakdowns, and today it continues to struggle economically as one of
the poorest European countries. Albania’s economic problems discourage an already poor
population from providing CSOs routinely with adequate funds and donations. Few Albanians
donate time,
e, money, and work to CSOs because they lack wealth or do not want to associate with
the public sphere. Today this cripples the financial viability and human resources of CSOs in
Albania. Organizations cannot carry out democratization and other projects re
regarding
garding
transnational issues of concern if they are financially unstable and so dependent on outside
donors.155 Figure 6 points out that the biggest struggle for CSOs is financial dependency. NGOs
depend on short term grants even though funding must be sustained over long periods of time to
allow for the success of long-term
term projects
projects.. Cuts in funding further hinder democracy-focused
democracy
projects in civil society.156 In fact, outside donors have failed to provide an adequate exit
strategy, so many
ny Albanian CSOs were not able to adapt to the donor withdrawal after 2000.
Figure 6: Evaluation of CSOs in former communist countries/ region

(Fagan and Sircar 2012, 22)
Lastly, donors drive Albanian CSOs to compete with one another for funding. Such an
environment forces CSOs to allocating resources to this competition rather than understanding
social issues, defining problems, coming up with solutions, and forming partnership.157 This type
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of environment is detrimental to a healthy civil society that in theory depends on collaboration to
bring about democracy and fight for global causes. The communist legacy has left behind an
economic and legal environment not hospitable for civil society, therefore CSOs in Albania
struggle to exist and make an impact today.
The unsustainability of Albanian CSOs in democratization projects can be summed up
by their overall lack of capacity (see Figure 6) due to a weak enabling environment. Again,
CSOs often are missing adequate human and financial resources because Albanians do not often
volunteer, engage in, or donate to CSOs. The low political, legal, and financial support from
government exacerbates the lack of capacity that CSOs face. The move from CSO leaders to
government likewise decreases the human capacity. Root causes in political culture for these
phenomena have been discussed.

No Reconciliation with the Communist Past
Lastly, failure in reconciliation with its Communist past has impeded Albanian
democracy and civil society’s impact in democratization. Post-communist transitional justice
failed in Albania because of a lack of political will on the part of Albanian politicians to punish
perpetrators of human rights.158 The state did not address gross human rights violations or bring
to trial perpetrators who had committed crimes against the people during the authoritarian
regime. Nor did it keep the participants of abuses during the communist regime from further
pursuing their careers through new political positions. In Albania, politicians who had been
active during the communist period, like Sali Berisha, took charge of new political parties after
the transition to democracy. In fact, the Socialist party was originally an offshoot of the past
Communist Party. As noted, when the new democracy attempted post-transitional justice in 1995
through the “Genocide Law,” it hijacked the post-transitional justice process to persecute
political opponents. Today there is no reconciliation between former communists and former
victims. People who were imprisoned wrongly as victims of the regime now struggle to cope
psychologically with their experiences and receive promised monetary compensation by the
government for their imprisonment.159 160 Moreover, there are no truth commissions in Albania
to openly discuss and share the past government’s wrongdoings with the public.161 The absence
of resolution through post-transitional justice “ultimately led to loss of trust from the general
public failing to detach the Albanian political scene from its communist past.”162 This failure in
reconciliation and justice denied victim closure. It set up a negative environment upon which to
build democracy and move forward into global integration.
Another example of Albanian society refusing to reconcile with its past is the case of the
secret service files which remain closed to the public. This clear lack of transparency endangers
open democracy by perpetuating the culture of distrust in Albania. Only few government
officials have opened and used some of the secret files, usually to attack opponents.163 However,
many people doubt that the files are still authentic because it is most likely that the Communist
party destroyed the files that would cause it harm and kept the ones that portray it more
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favorably. Albanians have little enthusiasm for opening the files, mostly because some view it as
futile, and others do not want to revisit old pains.164 165 Few fervent Albanian intellectuals and
civil society actors, like literature author Ismail Kadare, call for making public the secret service
files. But this does not appear to be on the political or civil society agenda.
Civil society is also not doing its job of providing support in acknowledging and
addressing the country’s dark history. Civil society is not facilitating a public discourse on
totalitarian ideas, decommunization,166 and a “culture of remembrance.”167 Instead there is a
culture of amnesia because most Albanians prefer to forget and move on from a sensitive and
dark past. This hinders Albania’s transition to democracy and participation in a global civil
society because the country has not acknowledged honestly the effects of communism in order to
determine how it will move forward. Civil society organizations like think tanks, NGOs, and
education centers are not focusing on resolving conflicts between the old communist structure
and the new “democratic/ market paradigm” that Albania is attempting to adapt.168 Hence,
Albania continues to show many traces from the totalitarian system despite technically having
democratic institutions in place and a spot in world affairs.

VIII. Conclusion
According to mainstream political theorists, there exists an inherent relationship between
civil society and democracy. Civil society is said to lead to democracy, while democracy is
dependent on civil society. Moreover, the values of democracy, civil society, and global
citizenship overlap, as a citizenry with democratic ideals often also contributes actively beyond
the national layer to a global civil society. However Albanian civil society faces a major unique
obstacle: the exceptional legacy of its past government, as Albania has one of most repressed
histories under Hoxha’s communism. Now one of the “third wave democracies,” Albania is
altering its political structures to meet the international standards for good governance and rule
of law. Albania, which was arguably the most suppressive Eastern European totalitarian state,
has made progress towards an open democracy, considering the short time period. After 1990,
Albanian civil society grew from being almost nonexistent to filling in areas where the
government was deficient in, such as social protection. Civil society’s main job now is to
facilitate Albania’s democratization, to support the new democracy, and to engage in issues of
global concern such as human rights and environmental sustainability. CSOs have begun to do
this through training, advocacy for rule of law, and anti-corruption campaigns.
Yet Albanian civil society faces difficulties in its tasks because it functions in a country
and society where the communist legacy is all too prominent. Albanian politics and civil society
internally reflect aspects of the past communist rule. They harbor values and skills that are not
well-suited for democracy or global citizenship (like a deficiency in civic engagement and
advocacy) because the public sphere leaders today were educated and trained in the political
culture of the authoritarian period. Albanians have little trust towards their government and civil
society. As a result of oppression under the Communist Party, Albanians engage less in the
public sphere whether for domestic or international matters. They maintain negative opinions
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towards politics and to some extent civil society itself. Furthermore, government, political
parties, and civil society institutions seem to use authoritarian-like forms of ruling and decisionmaking, which are counteractive to an open democratic society.
Next, civil society has not been very successful in bringing about democratization
because the external environment in which it works holds on to some detrimental influences
from the previous regime. There is still tension between government and civil society, as the
government fears opposition from civil society actors, just as it did during the dictatorship. The
lack of advocacy and financial support from Albanian society and government has kept civil
society relatively weak, and global citizenship rudimentary in Albania. Consequently, foreign
donors have promoted civil society most, but have made CSOs financially unsustainable and topdown in the process. Albanian CSOs lack financial and human capacity largely because they do
not operate in an encouraging, enabling environment.
Lastly, Albania’s moving forward with democratization and international causes is
hindered by the fact that the country and people have not reconciled with their own dark history
through adequate post-transitional justice. Addressing these internal and external factors of civil
society and its environment gives insight into why civil society struggles to lead Albania toward
democracy today. With these root issues being laid out and examined, Albania has the potential
to move forward and become a democracy that is led by an active citizenry in national and world
affairs.
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